What is true can be known or formally: φ → ◊Kφ VT Fitch's argument trivializes this principle. It uses a weak modal epistemic logic to show that VT collapses truth and knowledge, by taking a clever substitution instance for φ:
"P, but I don't know it" can be true, but it cannot be known, as K(P & ¬KP) evidently implies a contradiction. Now, in an epistemic logic for a single agent, the possible knowledge of a proposition φ requires that Kφ be satisfiable at some world in some model, and hence in all alternatives to that world. This differs from ordinary epistemic satisfiability, which just demands truth of φ at some world in some model. Tennant 2002 argues persuasively for the following restriction on the intended applications of VT to propositions φ:
Kφ is consistent CK(φ)
In simple epistemic S5-models, this special requirement amounts to global satisfiability of φ: i.e., its truth throughout some model. Like ordinary satisfiability, the new notion is decidable for most modal logics (Note 1), and hence constraints of knowability can be formulated at least in an effective manner. But there is a bit more to the situation! Our first observation is that CK only partially captures the intuition behind VT.
A dynamic shift: consistent update
Consider any epistemic model M, s, with a designated world s for the actual situation.
What might be known in this setting seems restricted to what might be known correctly about that situation s. We know already that it is one of the worlds in M. What we might learn is that this model can be shrunk still further, zooming in on the location of s. 
Epistemic logic dynamified
The simplest way of learning is by being told through a true new proposition which prunes the current epistemic model. In particular, a public announcement φ! of assertion [a]ψ ψ holds after every successful execution of action a
The expression a may be a computer program or some physical action, or a speech act. Now we can express statements about epistemic effects of successful communication:
There are complete and decidable calculi for this richer language. These include axioms relating statements about the result of an action to those that were true before. (Note 3.)
In particular, epistemic logics for communication emphasize the multi-agent character of speakers, hearers, and audiences. Accordingly, the language can iterate knowledge assertions, as in K 1 ¬K 2 P: '1 knows that 2 does not know that P '. There are also new notions for groups of agents G, such as common knowledge C G φ: everyone knows that φ, and they also know that the others know, and on to any finite depth of iteration. This point will return, as paradoxes for lonesome knowers may look brighter in groups.
The dynamic logic of learning
One open issue in dynamic epistemic logics concerns the generic effects of public announcement. Here is a putative, almost self-evident principle about the epistemic effects of a public statement that φ:
Announcing φ publicly in a group G makes φ common knowledge LP holds for atomic statements and many others. But it is false in general! E.g., if
someone tells you truly "P, but you don't know it", the result is a model where P holds everywhere, and your ignorance has disappeared. Of course, this is Moore's Paradox again, but now in a dynamic epistemic setting. This very update would occur in the model used earlier to strengthen the Consistency of Knowledge principle CK.
Thus we have arrived at the second main observation of this paper:
The 'paradoxical' behaviour of VT closely reflects that of LP.
But this analogy also suggests another way of looking at the Verificationist Thesis.
Upon reflection, the Learning Principle just seems an overly hasty assertion, and the given counter-example seems very natural. Indeed, announcements of ignorance are made frequently, and they can be very useful. E.g., in well-known puzzles like Muddy
Children it is precisely public announcements of ignorance which drive the solution process toward common knowledge of the true state of affairs. Logicians have adapted to this situation, and turned a problem into an object of study. Given the analogy between VT and LP, one might also develop an analogous enriched verificationist logic, distinguishing different roles for different types of statement.
In the remainder of this paper, we develop this technical theme a bit further. What does knowability or learnability of propositions amount to in a dynamic epistemic setting?
Exploring learnable propositions
As in the usual discussion of the Knower paradox, consider the case of a single agent.
Suggestions for the case of more agents will follow later. Define a learnable proposition φ as one whose truth can always become known by announcement of some suitable true formula A. I.e., the following implication is valid:
The existential modality <A!>Kφ, dual to [A!]Kφ, says that a truthful announcement of A is possible, leading to knowledge of φ. The consequent ∃A <A!>Kφ is shorthand for an infinite disjunction over all formulas A of our language.
Fact Learnability is decidable in S5.
Proof All models of an S5-language for a finite set of proposition letters can be enumerated, as the only options that matter are which propositional valuations to represent in the set of worlds. Thus, for each epistemic formula φ, we can enumerate all models M, s |= φ . Now, for φ to be learnable in the above sense, each of the latter models must have a submodel N containing s with φ true in every world of that submodel. But this can be checked effectively in the finite list.
QED
A stricter form of learnability demands that there be some finite set of announcements A one of which must lead to knowledge of φ in any given model of φ. This learnability by finite cases is equivalent to the above version, however, by the compactness theorem for S5 -or more simply, by the above enumeration argument. A truly stronger version is the existence of one single assertion A such that the following formula is valid:
Fact Uniform learnability is stronger than learnability.
Proof Consider the following 4-world model M:
p, q 3 ¬p, ¬q 2 p, ¬q 4 ¬p, q
Let φ be an S5-formula which is only true in the following minimal situations (a) in the pictured model M: at the worlds 1, 3, and no others (b) in the two models indicated by the ellipses: at both worlds.
It is easy to write down such a formula explicitly. According to the above description by model enumeration, φ is learnable: some update reveals it whenever it is true. But is clear no single formula A does this job uniformly, since the selection of the submodel in M has to depend on which of the two φ-worlds is our point of departure.
QED
Still stronger is the case where announcing φ itself produces its knowledge. This is the earlier learning situation of self-fulfilling assertions, restricted to the single-agent case:
Fact Statements can be uniformly learnable without being self-fulfilling.
Proof Consider the following model M, in the same style as the preceding one: Looking at some possible extensions adds still further detail to this perspective.
Refining the issues
Our analysis has looked at the verificationist principle and the Paradox of the Knower in terms of epistemic actions. This does not solve the original problem, but places it in a broader setting of interaction between many agents. In particular, the original formulation of the Paradox of the Knower now becomes a special case in several senses. For a start, even with a single agent, two different senses of learnability emerged: either by means of fixed assertions leading to knowledge, or by contextdependent assertions. But also, the multi-agent setting suggests further refinements.
With a single agent, the only candidate for the required knowledge level was Kφ. But now one can require knowledge for other agents as well: some, or all. E.g., Moore's Paradox disappears with some other agent 2 learning that "P, and 1 does not know it", as K 2 (P & ¬K 1 P) may quite well become true. Also, with groups, we can strengthen the original knowledge condition of VT as follows:
If φ is true, then it is possible that it becomes common knowledge in the group.
Perhaps each member finds out part of the truth, and by pooling this information, they arrive at C G φ. E.g., consider the following model M with actual world p, q:
Announcing q will make j know the Moore statement that "p and i does not know it".
But this can never become common knowledge in the group {i, j}. What can become common knowledge, however, is p & q, when i announces that q, and j then says p.
Many further distinctions can be made in interactive versions of knowability.
Moreover, more delicate learning scenarios involving secrecy, hiding, and even misleading, occur in epistemic update logic, with only special subgroups getting complete information about the true facts: cf. Baltag, Moss & Solecki 1998. (Note 5.) Finally, our perspective also adds a dimension. In recent jargon, the phrase "knowable"
suffers from the common disease called '∃-sickness'. This means using an existentially quantified notion in a situation where more explicit information is available, whose logic could be brought out. Common symptoms are frequent uses of "-ility"'s.
Compare: provability versus a concrete proof, past tense as 'once upon a time' versus some specific past episode, solvability versus producing an algorithm, winnability of a game versus a concrete winning strategy, etc. Dynamic epistemic logic would cure the sickness in this particular case of 'knowability' by making learning actions and their
properties an explicit part of the logic of verificationism, however construed. There may be a price for this expressive power, however, in that general results about learnability for many agents may become harder to formulate and prove (Note 6.)
Conclusion
We have shown that knowability of a proposition involves more than consistency of its 
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A multi-agent epistemic language with a common knowledge modality is not like plain S5.
Simple arguments like that for decidability of single-agent learnability no longer hold, and the same is true for other model-theoretic techniques. We do not know how our earlier results fare in this setting.
6
As a side benefit, our proposal also enriches dynamic epistemic logic. Our observations about single-agent S5 show that learnability assertions are definable there, and do not add anything new to the language. But now consider public announcements A! in a first-order language, where a formula A = A(x) restricts the individuals to the definable subdomain of those satisfying A . Now, expressive power may increase. E.g., take any strict linear order satisfying the first-order theory of (N, <) which extends beyond N, by adding copies of the integers Z. Its only first-order definable subsets of objects are the finite and the co-finite ones. Now consider the first-order learnability assertion that 'some true announcement makes the following true: the current object n is the greatest point, while every object different from zero has a predecessor'.
This can only be true for those objects n which lie at some finite distance from the zero of the model.
These form an initial copy of N, which is not definable in first-order logic. Balder ten Cate has pointed out one might also do this argument in a temporal language, closer to the epistemic modal original.
